The effects of oil pollution on the marine environment in the Gulf Of Guinea—the bonga oil field example by Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi
  
1 
The effects of oil  pollution on the marine environment  in the Gulf o f Guinea   
-  the  Bonga Oil Field example  
 
Abstract: 
 
Fish makes a significant contribution to the food security of millions of people in the Gulf of Guinea, 
accounting for up to 80 per cent of the animal protein, and sometimes is the only source of thereof, 
consumed in coastal communities across the region, including those in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria.  
However, such contribution is increasingly undermined by unsustainable practices that are harmful to the 
marine environment such as pollution, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and by climate 
change. This paper focuses on the role that pollution from oil spillages plays in damaging the marine 
environment, thereby exacerbating food insecurity in the region. Using the Bonga Oil Field spillage 
example, the paper exposes, from a policy perspective, the manner in which the shortcomings of existing 
environmental regulations and their implementation in Nigeria weaken efforts for a sustainable marine 
environment and, by extension, threatens the food security of coastal communities. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Fisheries contribute to enhancing food security either by acting directly as a source of essential 
nutrients or as a source of income for coastal communities who mostly depend on the resource for 
subsistence.1  They serve as a source, and sometimes the only source, of animal protein for many living 
in coastal communities in West and Central Africa—which make up the Gulf of Guinea defined here, 
in the broad sense, as the coastal states stretching from Senegal to Angola.2 Fisheries also play a 
significant role in food security by augmenting food supply and consumption in times of scarcity and 
by generating income for the purchase of food. 3 For 40 per cent of the West African population who 
live in the coastal areas, the fisheries sector plays a significant role in their food and economic security, 
employing an estimated nine million people in the region alone.4 However, these contributions are 
existentially threatened by the impact of climate change, pollution and unsustainable fishing practices 
that undermine the marine environment. 5  
The sustainability of the marine environment and the resources that lie beneath it have been 
undermined by the global rise in sea levels, which has resulted in a significant increase in the ocean’s 
uptake of CO2; the release of toxic wastes into the ocean; and, further to this, unsustainable practices 
such as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.6 These issues make the potential for food 
insecurity a high risk for coastal communities across the Gulf of Guinea. Specifically, climate change 
has been implicated as undermining the marine environment and leading to a depletion in fisheries 
resources.7 According to the World Bank, by 2050 climate change will contribute to the reduction of 
                                                 
1  Serge M. Garcia, “World Inventory of Fisheries. Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security. Issues Fact 
Sheets.” (Rome, 2005). 
2 See Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, “The Guinea-Bissau–Senegal Maritime Boundary Dispute,” Marine Policy 
61 (2015): 284–90, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.08.008, p.285; Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, “Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 
Countries in the Gulf of Guinea,” Marine Policy 99 (2019): 414–22, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.016. 
3 Serge M S.M Garcia and Andrew A.A Rosenberg, “Food Security and Marine Capture Fisheries: 
Characteristics, Trends, Drivers and Future Perspectives,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 365, 
no. 1554 (September 27, 2010): 2869–80. 
4 Okafor-Yarwood, “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) for Countries in the Gulf of Guinea.”, p.414. 
5 R.E Katikiro and E.D Macusi, “Impacts of Climate Change on West African Fisheries and Its Implications on 
Food Production,” Journal of Environmental Science and Management 15, no. 2 (2012): 83–95; UNEP, 
“Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland” (Kenya, 2011), https://doi.org/10.3370/lca.2.73; Lawrence Etim, 
Dyhia Belhabib, and Daniel Pauly, “An Overview of the Nigerian Marine Fisheries and a Re-Evaluation of Its 
Catch Data for the Years 1950 to 2010,” Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia (Vancouver, 2015). 
6 I. Okafor-Yarwood, “Nigeria’s Depleting Fish Stocks May Pose a Threat to Regional Security,” The 
Conversation, 2018. 
7 VWY Lam et al., “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 
II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” in African Journal of 
Marine Science, vol. 34, 2012, 103–17; Edward H. Allison et al., “Vulnerability of National Economies to the 
Impacts of Climate Change on Fisheries,” Fish and Fisheries 10, no. 2 (2009): 173–96, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-2979.2008.00310.x. 
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fisheries resources by up to 53 per cent in Nigeria, 56 per cent in the Ivory Coast and 60 per cent in 
Ghana. 8 Also implicated in exacerbating the decline of marine resources is the impact of overfishing 
and criminal activities such as IUU fishing. 9 So prevalent is the threat in the region that it amounts to 
an estimated 65 per cent of the legal catch, with Nigeria losing about $29 million dollars per annum to 
illegal shrimping alone.10 Likewise, a great deal has been written about the impact of pollution by 
multinational oil companies and their role in damaging the marine environment in the Niger Delta area 
and by extension the rest of the Gulf of Guinea. 11  
It has been argued that the role of pollution in adversely affecting the ocean’s resources is limited 
when compared to the impact of overfishing. Espousing this view, Till notes that the crisis in fish supply 
is largely due to unsustainable fishing—overfishing and IUU fishing—and not pollution.12 Whereas 
this paper recognises that overfishing and IUU fishing contribute to the decline in fisheries resources, 
it will focus on the role of pollution resulting from oil spillages by multinational oil companies operating 
in Nigeria. It does so by using the Bonga Oil Field spillage of 2011 as a case study.  Emphasis on the 
Bonga Oil Field incident is crucial because little has been written regarding its effect on fisheries and 
the many people living in the affected communities who depend on fish for subsistence. The Niger 
Delta is usually described as ecologically diverse, its mangroves serving as a breeding ground for 
different species of fish in the Gulf of Guinea.13 This makes it a useful case study for understanding the 
long-term food security implications of the decline in fisheries resulting from pollution.   
This paper employs qualitative research methods, such as primary interviews with the Coordinating 
Chairman of the Akwa-Ibom State, who is also the Acting Chairman of the Niger Delta Artisan Fishers 
                                                 
8 Magda Lovei, “Climate Impacts on African Fisheries: The Imperative to Understand and Act,” The World 
Bank Blog, 2017, http://blogs.worldbank.org/nasikiliza/climate-impacts-on-african-fisheries-the-imperative-to-
understand-and-act. 
9 Alkaly Doumbouya et al., “Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal 
Fishing: The Case of West Africa,” Frontiers in Marine Science 4, no. March (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2017.00050; Etim, Belhabib, and Daniel Pauly, “An Overview of the Nigerian 
Marine Fisheries and a Re-Evaluation of Its Catch Data for the Years 1950 to 2010.” 
10 Okafor-Yarwood, “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) for Countries in the Gulf of Guinea.” 
11 Kevin Nengia, “Pollution:Bonny Communities, Group Lament Illegal Bunkering,” The Tide, December 2013, 
http://www.thetidenewsonline.com/2013/12/04/pollutionbonny-communities-group-lament-illegal-bunkering/; 
Patience Ivie Ihejirika, “‘Niger Delta Oil Pollution Has Badly Affected Agriculture, Fishing,’” Leadership, June 
8, 2016, http://leadership.ng/news/534056/niger-delta-oil-pollution-badly-affected-agriculture-fishing; Sunny 
Ofehe, “Environmental Pollution in the Niger Delta,” accessed April 1, 2016, 
http://www.ofehe.com/article3.htm; Emma Amaize, “Pollution Forces N-Delta Fishermen, Farmers to Abandon 
Occupation,” Vanguard Nigeria, 2016, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/09/pollution-forces-n-delta-
fishermen-farmers-abandon-occupation/; A.A. Kafada, “Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and 
Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” Global Journal of Science Frontier Research Environment & Earth 
Svience 12, no. 3 (2012): 18–27. 
12 Geoffrey Till, Sea Power - a Guide for the Twenty Fisrt Century, 3rd ed. (London & New York: Routledge, 
2013), p.285. 
13 Olanike Kudirat Adeyemo, Oniovosa Eloho Ubiogoro, and Olufemi Bolarinwa, “Oil Exploitation, Fisheries 
Resources and Sustainable Livelihood in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” Nature & Faune 24, no. 1 (2009): 56–61 
p.59. 
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Association of Nigeria (ARFAN) and the President of the Bonny Island Fishers Association, Bonny Local 
Government Area in Rivers State. In response to the empirical research, this paper argues that 
multinational oil companies continue to undermine the environment in which they operate not least as 
the existing regulations on petroleum exploration, and the obligations that they impose upon these 
multinationals in relation to the ecosystems under threat, are not robustly implemented.14 Section two 
sets the scene, using the Bonga Oil Field example to emphasise the food security implications of oil 
spillages on littoral communities in the Niger Delta region. This is followed by a review of selected 
environmental legislations and/or guidelines and the role of agencies in Nigeria such as the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA), the National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) 
and Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN). 
Although there are others,15 investigating the aforementioned provides sufficient concrete examples of 
the failures of existing regulations and agencies charged with the responsibility of ensuring a sustainable 
environment in Nigeria. The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the imperative of enacting 
amendments to further strengthen existing regulations and either establishing a new independent 
agency, or upgrading an existing one, to give it adequate powers to oversee a robust response to 
incidences of oil spillages.  
                                                 
14 The interviews were conducted between December 2015 and June 2017 as part of the author’s PhD thesis data 
collection. 
15 See Eghosa Osa Ekhator, “Environmental Protection in the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: The Roles of 
Governmental Agencies,” International Energy Law Review 5 (2013): 196–203; C. Cragg, J. Hurst-Croft, and I. 
Samiama, “Pollution Control in the Global Oil Industry in Relation to Reform in Nigeria” (Nigeria, 2011), 
http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Environmental-Regulation-and-
Pollution.pdf. 
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2.  Pollut ion and food insecurity –  The Bonga Oil Field Spillage example  
Fisheries contribute to the food security of communities in the Niger Delta, by serving as sources of 
income for many of the people living in the region. In some communities such as those in Bonny Local 
Government Area in Rivers State, around 70 per cent of the population depends on fish for their 
livelihood.16 For a lot of women living in the region, fish also provides an opportunity for them to earn 
a living as fisherwomen or fishmongers.17 However, the continued contribution of fish as a central food 
security resource is threatened by pollution in the form of oil spillages from the multinational oil 
companies operating in the area. 
 The food security implications of reduced catch have a devastating impact on the fisher folks who 
depend on fish for subsistence. According to Vreÿ one cause thereof is oil pollution which aggravates 
the threat to the marine environment, and thus undermines its contribution as a source of food.18 The 
Niger Delta region is one area that, over the years, has experienced severe pollution resulting from oil 
spillages. Specifically, since the exploitation of oil started in 1958, an estimated 13 million barrels of 
oil have been spilled in more than 10,000 incidents in the region.19 The multinational oil companies are 
of the view that most of these spillages are due to sabotage and/or vandalisation of pipelines.20 Whilst 
the role of sabotage in the many incidences of oil spillages in the Niger Delta cannot be denied, the 
reality, however, is that some of the pipelines used by the oil companies are dilapidated, with a 
considerable amount of the oil spillages due to the corrosion of aging facilities.21 The resulting effects 
of such pollution not only undermine the coastal environment, but they also increase human suffering 
especially for the communities affected. This is because those that rely on fisheries for subsistence are 
sometimes not able to engage in the trade for months as they are forced to wait for the clean-up exercises 
to be completed. The suffering is made worse because, in some cases, they are never compensated for 
their loss.22  
                                                 
16 Dick Wittenberg, “Oil, Gas and Mining: The Bonny Island LNG Project: In Bonny It Never Becomes Night 
Anymore,” ECA Watch, 2004, http://www.eca-
watch.org/problems/oil_gas_mining/bonnyisland/BonnyIsland130704.html. 
17 Tendai Marima, “There’s an Invisible Cost to Nigeria’s Oil Spill Disasters,” Quartz Media, 2016, 
https://qz.com/859201/theres-an-invisible-cost-to-nigerias-oil-spill-disasters/; Ibim Adaba Tonye and Amiye 
Francis, “Women and Post Harvest Fish Production in the Niger Delta Area,” Journal of Agriculture and 
Veterinary Science 7, no. 3 (2014): 78–82. 
18 Francois Vreÿ, “Good Order at Sea off West Africa,” in Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences, 
ed. Thomas Mandrup and Francois Vreÿ (South Africa: Sun Press, 2015), 183–206, p.190. 
19 Hans Langeveld and Simon Delany, “The Impact of Oil Exploration, Extraction and Transport on Mangrove 
Vegetation and Carbon Stocks in Nigeria,” 2014, https://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/rapporten/oil-industry-
impact-nigeria, p.4. 
20 Barisere Rachel Könnet, “Inadequate Monitoring and Enforcement in the Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case of 
Shell and Ogoniland,” Cornell International Law Journal 47, no. 1 (2014): 181–204, p.194; Tom Bawden, 
“Shell ‘Uses Sabotage Claims to Avoid Blame for Nigeria Oil Spills,’” Independent, 2013. 
21 Barisere Rachel Könnet, “Inadequate Monitoring and Enforcement in the Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case of 
Shell and Ogoniland,” Cornell International Law Journal 47, no. 1 (2014): 181–204p.196. 
22 See Chioma Onuegbu, “Oil Spill: Mobil Hasn’t Paid Any A’Ibom Community Compensation in 46 Years – 
Chief Nduese Essien,” Vanguard Nigeria, 2017, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/oil-spill-mobil-hasnt-
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In an interview with Rev. Samuel Ayadi, the Coordinating Chairman of the Akwa-Ibom State and 
the Acting Chairman of the Niger Delta Branch ARFAN, he noted that the bad management and lack 
of respect for the environment by oil companies have robbed his members of the ability to provide for 
their families including not being able to send their children to school. According to him, the oil 
leakages which result in the pollution of the coastal environment are due to lack of management, as 
some of these pollutions are caused by rusty pipelines that are no longer fit for purpose. He also noted 
that the current system is ineffective in holding oil companies to account, which makes them less 
concerned about caring for the environment in which they work, compared to how the same oil 
companies operate in the developed countries—especially their countries of origin in the global North— 
were they are held accountable for their actions.23 The lack of respect for the marine environment he 
adds, is evident also, in the way oil companies engage in haphazard clean-up exercises, or not at all, 
which in the long run, causes further harm to the marine environment.24 Espousing this view, Ndimele, 
Saba, Ojo, Ndimele, Anetekhai and Erondu argues that the degradation caused by oil spillages is 
worsened by the fact that the oil companies are often reluctant to clean up their spillages, even when 
they do, the methods used tends to cause more harm to the marine environment.25  
The Bonga Oil Field Spillage by the Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) 
on the 20th December 2011 exemplifies his claims. The spill which was caused by equipment failure 
resulted in the discharge of an estimated 40,000 barrels of crude oil into the Atlantic Ocean—with more 
than 168, 000 people from 350 communities in the Niger Delta area affected.26 As well as the immediate 
damage caused to the marine environment—the pollution of the mangrove where 60 per cent of the fish 
in the Gulf of Guinea breed 27—by the spillage, which covered 185 kilometres along the Nigeria coast, 
disrupted the source of livelihood of an estimated 28,000 fishermen operating in the region.28 
Beyond the immediate environmental damage caused by the spillage, Rev. Ayadi noted that it 
resulted in the suspension of fishing activities for his members for nine months to allow for the clean-
up exercise. This period was extremely difficult for many of the fisher folks and their families as they 
                                                 
paid-aibom-community-compensation-46-years-chief-nduese-essien/; P. Steyn, “Oil, Ethnic Minority Groups 
and Environmental Struggles against Multinational Oil Companies and the Federal Government in the Nigerian 
Niger Delta State since the 1990s,” in A History of Environmentalism: Local Struggles, Global Histories, ed. 
Lise Sedrez Marco Armiero (London.New Delhi.New York.Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2014), 57–82. 
23 Interview with Rev. Ayadi, (2017). Coordinating Chairman Akwa-Ibom State and the Acting Chairman Niger 
Delta Branch of ARFAN. Telephone interview, June 28th. 
24 Ibid. 
25 P.E. Ndimele et al., “Remediation of Crude Oil Spillage,” in The Political Ecology of Oil and Gas Activities 
in the Nigerian Aquatic Ecosystem, ed. P.E. Ndimele (United Kingdom: Elsevier Academic Press, 2018), 367–
86. 
26 Arodiegwu Eziukwu, “Bonga Oil Spill Affected 168,000 People in 350 Communities — Monarch,” Premium 
Times, 2015, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/south-south-regional/180674-bonga-oil-spill-affected-
168000-people-in-350-communities-monarch.html. 
27 André Standing, “Corruption and Industrial Fishing in Africa,” U4 Brief, vol. 7 (Cape Town, 2008), 
https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3188-corruption-andindustrial-fishing-in-africa.pdf. 
28 Arodiegwu Eziukwu, “Bonga Oil Spill Affected 168,000 People in 350 Communities — Monarch.” 
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did not have an alternative source of livelihood, nor were they compensated for their loss.29 Rev. Ayadi 
also noted that the Bonga fish, which the facility is named after and which were commonly caught in 
the area, are now difficult to catch, due to the Bonga oil spill and the subsequent environmentally 
unfriendly clean-up exercise that followed. According to him:  
There is hunger in the fishing communities, there is no fuel subsidy from the government, our 
effort to survive is threatened by pollution. Fishing is the only thing we know. The Bonga fish 
that is common in our region throughout the year is now impossible to catch due to the oil 
spillage. Rather than execute an effective clean-up, the company used chemicals to sink the oil, 
which leads to further damage to the surviving species. As I speak to you, we don’t even see 
Bonga fish to catch as much as we used to, which is why some fishermen are turning to 
crayfish.30 
Whether or not his claim can be substantiated, what is evident is that pollution from the operations of 
multinational oil companies has a devastating impact on the food security of the people whose source 
of livelihood is predominantly from the sea.31 The outcome is not only the immediate pollution of the 
marine environment, but, for the families affected, the spillage results in the lack of income leading to 
poverty, hunger, ill health and the ceasing of education for their children. 32 This is damaging to the 
achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) such as SDG 14 which 
seeks to ensure the sustainable use of the sea, marine and ocean resources, whose attainment is already 
threatened by IUU fishing by commercial/foreign vessels.33 
In a region with limited employment opportunities, one cannot ignore the potential impact food 
insecurity might have on the overall security of the region as those affected seek an alternative source 
of livelihood. 34 There is nowhere that this is more accurate than in the Niger Delta region, as the actions 
of multinational oil companies have contributed to environmental degradation and untold hardship in 
                                                 
29 Interview with Rev. Ayadi, (2017). Coordinating Chairman Akwa-Ibom State and the Acting Chairman Niger 
Delta Branch of ARFAN. Telephone interview, June 28th. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Okafor-Yarwood, “Nigeria’s Depleting Fish Stocks May Pose a Threat to Regional Security”; Julius Osahon, 
“Oil Exploration Threatening 6.5 Million Fishing Population in Niger Delta’,” The Guardian Nigeria, 2018, 
https://guardian.ng/news/oil-exploration-threatening-6-5-million-fishing-population-in-niger-delta-2/. 
32 See Arodiegwu Eziukwu, “Bonga Oil Spill Affected 168,000 People in 350 Communities — Monarch”; 
Owen Akenzua, “Oil Spill Victims Sue Shell in UK over Alleged $3.6b Compensation,” The Guardian Nigeria, 
2017, https://guardian.ng/news/oil-spill-victims-sue-shell-in-uk-over-alleged-3-6b-compensation/; Adeyemo, 
Ubiogoro, and Adedeji, “Oil Exploitation, Fisheries Resources and Sustainable Livelihood in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria.” 
33 Also affected: SDG 1 seeks to see an end to poverty, SDG 2, seeks to have a world without hunger, SDG 3, 
seeks to ensure good health, SDG 4, seeks to promote education and SDG 8 seeks to promote economic growth. 
See Okafor-Yarwood, “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) for Countries in the Gulf of Guinea.”, p. 420. 
34 F.C Onuoha, “Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea : Nigeria as a Microcosm” (Qatar, 2012); 
Michael Baghebo, Ubi Peter Samuel, and N. Nwagbara Eucharia, “Environmental Damage Caused by the 
Activities of Multiinational Oil Giants in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” Journal of Humanities and Social 
Science 5, no. 6 (2012): 9–13. 
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the affected communities, especially for women.35 Some of these women tend to diversity their 
livelihood activities by engaging in trading business, especially when their husbands or partners have 
left in search of alternative income following the pollution of their farmlands and fishing grounds.36 For 
others, alternative source of livelihood includes ‘taking advantage of the cash inducement of oil workers 
and others in the oil economy’37 by engaging in prostitution. Suffice to say that the membership of the 
once active militant groups in the Niger Delta is comprised of former farmers and fishermen who have 
lost their sources of income to pollution attributed to the oil companies.38  
The increased potential for transborder conflict, as fisher folks travel beyond their usual fishing 
grounds in search for fish, is also worth mentioning.  During the interview with Rev. Ayadi, he noted 
that it is common practice for the Cameroonian ‘gendarme’ (police) to intimidate fisher folks from 
Nigeria by extorting money from them or confiscating their fishing equipment.39 It came as a shock, 
nevertheless, when, in July 2017, it was reported that the same police killed 97 Nigerian fisher folks 
following a dispute over an alleged levy.40 Although this claim is contested by the Cameroonian 
government, the Nigerian government have accused Cameroon of breaching an agreement to protect its 
citizens.41  
Given the migratory/transboundary nature of fish and the fact that an estimated 60 per cent of the 
fisheries species in the Gulf of Guinea breed in the mangrove of Niger Delta,42 the continued pollution 
of the marine environment in the Niger Delta is likely to undermine the fish food security of littoral 
communities in other countries in the Gulf of Guinea.43 This will also have financial implications for 
countries in the region, especially where some of the species are already on the overexploited list, as 
depleting stock means less resource to attract investors from distant water fishing nations.44  
                                                 
35 Ndimele et al., “Remediation of Crude Oil Spillage.” 
36 E.B. Inyang and E.E. Udong, “Livelihood Insecurity and Diversification among Women in an 
Environmentally-Challenged Niger Delta Region, Nigeria,” The International Journal of Humanities & Social 
Studies 1, no. 1 (2013): 35–43. 
37 Edlyne Ezenongaya Anugwom and Kenechukwu N. Anugwom, “The Other Side of Civil Society Story: 
Women, Oil and the Niger Delta Environmental Struggle in Nigeria,” GeoJournal 74, no. 4 (2009): 333–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-008-9239-4, p.342. 
38 I. Okafor-Yarwood, “Pollution, Fisheries and Food (in)Security in the Gulf of Guinea,” TLI Think, 2018, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3117284, p.8. 
39 Interview with Rev. Ayadi, (2017). Coordinating Chairman Akwa-Ibom State and the Acting Chairman Niger 
Delta Branch of ARFAN. Telephone interview, June 28th. 
40 Okafor-Yarwood, “Nigeria’s Depleting Fish Stocks May Pose a Threat to Regional Security.”  
41 Okafor-Yarwood, “Pollution, Fisheries and Food (in)Security in the Gulf of Guinea.”, p.8. 
42 Standing, “Corruption and Industrial Fishing in Africa.” 
43 See Beth Polidoro et al., “Red List of Marine Bony Fishes of the Eastern Central Atlantic” (Switzerland, 
2016); Tony J. Pitcher and William W L Cheung, “Fisheries: Hope or Despair?,” Marine Pollution Bulletin 74, 
no. 2 (2013): 506–16, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2013.05.045, p.510 & 514. 
44 Alfonso Daniels et al., “Western Africa’s Missing Fish; the Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing and under-Reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets,” 2016, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10665.pdf; Etim, Belhabib, and Daniel Pauly, 
“An Overview of the Nigerian Marine Fisheries and a Re-Evaluation of Its Catch Data for the Years 1950 to 
2010.” 
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Finally, whilst it is important to highlight the role of multinational oil companies in undermining the 
marine environment and thus threatening the long-term food security of littoral communities, it is 
impossible to ignore the role bad governance has played in contributing to the neglect of the marine 
environment. This is especially evident when one takes into account that these same oil companies tend 
to operate in a different manner and uphold existing environmental regulations in their home countries 
and/or when operating in developed countries.45 To this end, the ensuing section looks at existing 
environmental regulations in Nigeria and their limitations. 
3.  Environmental regulations and their  shortcomings  
 
The Niger Delta region has strategic value to Nigeria due the abundance of energy resources within 
its boundaries. The crude oil derived from the region accounts for 95 per cent of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings, and 80 per cent of the total revenue accruable to the Federal account.46  The gross 
domestic product (GDP) contribution from oil in 2017 was 8.68 per cent, rising to 9.61 per cent in the 
first quarter of 2018 which generates the bulk of the government’s revenue.47 Also, abundant in the 
region are the once arable land, forests, rivers and mangroves teeming with fisheries and aquaculture 
resources. 48 Yet, the former richness of the region is no longer reflected in the day to day reality of the 
people living in it, many of whom are either fisher folks or farmers. This is ultimately due to poor 
governance,49 which has resulted in environmental degradation—pollution of the farmlands and water 
sources—by the multinational oil companies operating in the region, thereby undermining the sources 
of livelihood of families and communities.50 
                                                 
45 See Amaize, “Pollution Forces N-Delta Fishermen, Farmers to Abandon Occupation”; John Vidal, “Nigeria’s 
Agony Dwarfs the Gulf Oil Spill. The US and Europe Ignore It,” The Guardian, 2010; Peter Roderick, “Gas 
Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrocity” (Amsterdam, 2005), 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pan.2012.11.029. 
46 Donald O. Omagu, “Oil Multinationals: Environmental Genocide and Socioeconomic Development in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” in Environment and Economics in Nigeria, ed. Toyin Falola and Adam Paddock (New 
York & London: Routledge, 2012), 107–24; E K Agbaeze, S N Udeh, and I O Onwuka, “Resolving Nigeria’s 
Dependency on Oil – The Derivation Model,” Journal of African Studies and Development 7, no. 1 (2015): 1–
14, https://doi.org/10.5897/JASD2014.0303. 
47 NBS, “Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report Q4 & Full Year 2017” (Abuja, 2018), 
http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nanapages/download/329; NBS, “Nigeria Gross Domestic Product Report Q1 
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Bloomberg, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-21/nigerian-economy-expands-in-first-
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The multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria have to take responsibility for their own laxity, 
evident in decades of poor maintenance and underinvestment, which have resulted in the corrosion of 
ageing facilities and the subsequent equipment failure and oil spillages.51 Similarly, the Nigerian state 
may be criticised for not having a robust system for regulating the activities of these companies and 
holding them responsible for their actions. The first oil exploration in the Niger Delta occurred in 1956; 
however, it was not until 1992 (36 years later) that the first ever environment impact assessment was 
undertaken.52 The first ever statute aimed exclusively at addressing environmental issues was enacted 
in 1988 under Decree 58 of the same year—the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act. The 
amended ACT No. 59 of 1992 saw the establishment of FEPA—now Ministry of Environment—which 
is responsible for instituting natural environmental standards.53 However, since it was established, 
FEPA has not implemented any legal sanctions or compelled any of the multinational oil companies 
operating in the country to pay compensation or restore the polluted environment to an acceptable level. 
Hence it is deemed to be ineffective.54 The lack of and/or weak enforcement of FEPA resulted in low 
compliance by the oil companies and subsequently lead to its repeal and replacement by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria in 2007.55   
Beyond FEPA, other regulators have been introduced, but they too have not yet brought about any 
significant changes. The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) was 
established in 2006 for the purpose of implementing the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 
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(NOSCP).56 The institution of the contingency plan and the agency that followed are in compliance 
with the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC 
90),57 to which Nigeria is a signatory. Specifically, Article 1 (1) of OPRC stipulates that member states 
should take appropriate measures to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident.58 However, as 
with the limitations of other existing regulations, executing their role and enforcing the provisions of 
NOSCP have been difficult due to what the Director-General of NOSDRA describes as ‘inadequate 
funds, manpower, equipment and a weak legal framework…’.59 These inadequacies have hindered their 
ability to effectively execute their mandate.   
The National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) 
Establishment Act 2007—replacing Federal Environmental Protection Act—which is responsible for 
environmental protection, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable exploitation of natural resources 
in the country. 60 In addressing the subject of spillages and/or the deposit of harmful materials in the 
environment, section 27(1) notes: 
The discharge in such harmful quantities of any hazardous substance into the air or upon the 
land and the waters of Nigeria or at the adjoining shorelines is prohibited, except where such 
discharge is permitted or authorized under any law in force in Nigeria.61 
However, the prohibition of the discharge of hazardous substances in ‘harmful quantities’ by the 
NESREA Act, according to Oshionebo, undermines the Act itself. According to him, by prohibiting the 
discharge of hazardous wastes in ‘harmful quantities’, the Act infers that ‘unharmful quantities’ of such 
substances can be discharged.62 Whilst there is an established limit on the discharge of effluents in 
Nigeria,63 Oshienobo and Cui argue that NESEAR does not have the capability to enforce this provision 
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because the agency does not have the expertise and equipment to do so. 64 Ekhator has compared the 
similarities between NOSDRA and NESREA and arrived at the conclusion that in an attempt to prevent 
a conflict of interest between the two agencies, the investigation of oil spills was removed from the 
ambit of NESREA.65 As a result, NOSDRA is ‘statutorily required to prevent, control and respond to 
oil spill incidences in Nigeria’. 66 NESREA however, despite ‘its innovative provisions of mobile courts 
in environmental cases, has been criticised on the ground that it is narrowly focused in comparison with 
the now defunct FEPA Act’. 67 Evidentially, the problem does not lie with the lack of legislation as 
there are many, but, rather, the lack of capacity to enforce them. Specifically, there are different 
underlying causes as to why existing regulations and efforts to implement them have failed, including, 
but not limited to a perceived lack of political will, corruption, ineffective implementation of regulations 
where they exist, the lack of enforcement when regulations are violated, the lack of institutional capacity 
of regulatory agencies and overambitious legislation or guidelines.68  
The failure to implement existing regulations in their entirety can also be put down to  conflict of 
interest, as the Federal Government is responsible for instituting and implementing the environmental 
regulations, yet they also own some of the oil companies being regulated.69  According to Cragg, Hurst-
Croft and Samiama, ‘if the regulators, or indeed the ministry, rely on the oil sector for revenue in any 
way…’,70 there might be instances where they (in the Nigerian case, those charged with the 
responsibility of putting into effect the many environmental laws or guidelines) may be reluctant to 
enforce the stipulations of the regulations because enforcement will mean a reduction in their income.71  
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For instance, effecting the implementation of the environmental regulation in its entirety may require 
the suspension of oil production, to allow for the clean-up of contaminated lands and water sources. 72  
However, since the Federal government rely on the oil sector for a huge part of their revenue, it is not 
surprising that the agencies responsible for enforcing these regulations appear to be inadequately alert 
to the many violations of the regulations and sometimes are seen to turn a blind eye. Espousing this 
argument Ezike notes that the ‘…penalty for gas flaring remains a paltry sum of N10.00 (£0.0215)… 
for every cubic [foot] of gas flared’,73 which makes one wonder whether there were any real intentions 
to put an end to gas flaring, which accounts for an estimated 85 per cent of the gas produced in Nigeria.74   
The preceding argument is true for Nigeria, where the regulating authority is also aligned with the 
Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Resources). The possibility for a conflict of interest is evinced by the 
fact that it is within the remit of the Nigerian Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) to supervise 
and regulate the oil and gas sector, as well as enforce environmental laws. Moreover, the DPR is 
formally part of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) and the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) and thus, is closely aligned with the Ministry of Energy, which is responsible for 
developing the country’s energy resources, of which the oil and gas industry is an integral part.75 It 
follows that, the DPR, cannot independently enforce regulations regarding oil pollution due to these 
said conflicts of interest.76 Encapsulating this position, the World Bank notes, 
…this situation has resulted in the Government inadequately regulating oil pollution while, at 
the same time, being party to [the cause of] much of the oil related environmental problems of 
the Niger Delta.77 
There is also the issue of corruption, especially by the elites in the communities hosting the oil 
companies (Kings and village heads), which underscores the limitations of the spillage compensation 
policy when it is implemented. This practice, according to Adeyemo, is termed the ‘benefit captor 
syndrome’. These are elites that supposedly represent and or receive compensation on behalf of their 
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communities; however, this compensation is rarely in fact received by the communities.78  During a 
focused group discussion with fisher folks in Bonny Island, those present shared their experience of 
misappropriation of compensation money by the traditional ruling elites. According to them: 
…community Chiefs especially, the King is as bad as the government. They spend the money 
given to the communities as compensation for pollution or as gifts from the oil companies on 
expensive cars and sending their children abroad. While the people were hungry and struggling 
to make ends meet, the King had a party some years ago to celebrate his first billion.79  
Similar narratives abound across most communities in the Niger Delta, as traditional leaders often fail 
to redistribute funds to the relevant people, which has resulted in resentment and frustration, especially 
amongst the youth.80 
The implementation of the existing regulations/guidelines are also hampered by a triad of 
problems—ineffective implementation of regulations where they exist, the lack of enforcement when 
those regulations are violated and the lack of institutional capacity of regulatory agencies. The latter 
issue, which strongly contributes to the second, has resulted in poor monitoring and complete reliance 
on the oil companies for data, thus allowing them to follow their own assessment.81 As a result, 
regulating agencies cannot corroborate the data provided by the oil companies, as they do not have the 
resources to do so. More precisely, NOSDRA is statutorily responsible for detecting and responding to 
oil spillages in Nigeria; however, a 2013 report by Amnesty International noted that the investigations 
for such spillages are usually spearheaded by oil companies’ personnel and not by NOSDRA. The 
agency is thus seen to be dependent on the company involved in an oil spill incident, as the oil company 
provides the transport to the site of the spillages as well as technical expertise and data, all of which 
agencies such as NOSDRA and the DPR do not have.82 This also gives the oil companies the freedom 
to decide when the investigation starts. The historical failure to establish an independent regulator that 
is well equipped to enforce the regulations and guidelines, despite the efforts of previous governments 
to do so, is, according to Thurber, Emelife and Heller ‘…part of a lurching reform that does nothing to 
sustainably alter the functioning of the petroleum sector’.83 
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Finally, environmental regulations or guidelines have not always lead to any meaningful outcome 
for communities in the Niger Delta because they are overambitious and unrealistic, and thus falter very 
easily.84  This has made some of the stipulations of EGASPIN, which is within the auspices of the DPR, 
impossible to implement.85 Specifically, EGASPIN requires that, in cases of oil spills, actions must be 
taken within 24 hours of the spillage, which is impractical given that, in many instances, the oil 
companies might not be aware of such spillages until much later, which often is outside the 24 hours’ 
time limit.86 Even when the oil companies are able to meet the 24 hours deadline as stipulated, as 
previously stated NOSDRA, which is the enforcement agency, does not have the capacity to enforce 
the regulations as they rely on the oil companies for transportation to spillage sites and data. The failures 
in the enforcement agencies are evident from the fact that six years since the Bonga Oil Field Spillage, 
communities and even the government have not been compensated, with SNEPCO refusing to pay a 
US$3.6 billion fine despite a court ruling in June 2018,87 for it to do so.88 Amongst other things, the 
Bonga Oil Field example not only shows the lack of respect by SNEPCO for the communities that have 
welcomed them, but also highlights the incapacity of the enforcement agencies to fully implement the 
responsibilities associated with their institutions. The Bonga Oil Field example is typical of how 
spillages are addressed in the Niger Delta. In Bonny Island for instance, which is home to the Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), in cases of oil spillages fisher folks have been known to be prevented 
from fishing in the affected area for up to six months to allow for the clean-up of the spillages. 
According to the President of the Bonny Fishers Association: 
… spillages spoil our nets, so we tend not to fish in a particular area for up to six months until 
such spillages are cleared, with little to no compensation for the accrued loss in earning.89 
This has resulted in some of the affected fisher folks fishing further afield or looking for an alternative 
source of income to adapt to the impact of depleting fisheries.  
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4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the role of pollution as one of the key factors that undermines the sustainable 
use of the marine environment, especially in the Niger Delta region. It has argued that pollution in the 
form of spillages by the multinational oil companies operating in the region has played a significant 
role in undermining the marine environment leading to the depletion of fisheries resources. This has 
had severe consequences on the food security of the littoral communities across the Niger Delta, as their 
main source of livelihood has been diminished. In reviewing the responsibility of the Nigerian 
government to ensure that the perpetrating companies are held accountable for their actions, the paper 
has found that, whereas the existing regulations sometimes do not go far enough, the main problem is 
that the enforcement agencies do not have the capacity to fulfil their mandate which perpetuates the 
downward spiral of environmental degradation affecting coastal communities.  
To this end, this paper notes that it is impossible for a country like Nigeria to reverse the impact of 
years of neglect of their littoral environment unless the government takes firm action in holding the oil 
companies accountable for their pollution. The first step required is a comprehensive strengthening of 
some of the legal frameworks /guidelines on the environment – such as EGASPIN, by addressing some 
of the loopholes that have already been identified such as the unrealistic timeline for reporting and 
acting on oil spills. Coupled with that, for the legal frameworks to be effective, there is a need to ensure 
adequate support for the enforcement agencies in the form of investment in equipment and manpower 
that would allow them to carry out their duties to implement both existing and enhanced regulations 
with less dependence on the oil companies. There is also an urgent need for ensuring that affected 
communities are duly compensated, and clean-up exercises are carried out to the same level that is 
found in developed countries. Furthermore, effective implementation of the existing environmental 
regulations can only happen through enhancing the powers of regulating agencies and/or making them 
independent of the Ministry of Energy to allow for unbiased representation and implementation of said 
regulations. The review of the existing guidelines and regulations should also be swiftly followed by 
investment in infrastructure to be funded with fines generated from the infringement of laws.  
Finally, the government must work to ensure that personnel are trained to be able to do their jobs 
effectively, as well as provide a better channel for the general public to get involved. These measures 
will make way for a stronger agency that will be committed to rooting out corrupt practices and fulfilling 
its primary responsibility, which is a commitment to a sustainable Nigerian environment. Failure to 
regulate and empower these institutions would see an increase in the negative cycle of the response to 
the perceived injustices in the Niger Delta, as the people affected by oil spillages continue to seek 
alternative sources of livelihood, including engaging in activities that threaten the security of the 
Nigerian state itself. Taking this much-needed action would go a long way in ensuring the sustainability 
of the marine resources, not only in Nigeria but across the Gulf of Guinea. 
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